Recent changes to IEC 61511-1 may come as a surprise to some, but the changes could easily be predicted by the user frustration vented at each IEC 61511 committee meeting over the last 5 years. Limited experience with the standard revealed some serious implementation issues. When each clause was considered through a lens focused on lowering the risk of hazardous events, the intent and approach of most clauses could generally be correctly ascertained without too much difficulty. However, some simply refused to see what was not explicit, so instead of editing the standard to better focus it on the high level work processes necessary to achieve safety integrity, the standard is now longer and contains more constraints and requirements across the entire lifecycle. To bring some clarity to the changes, I will tackle one specific type of change in IEC 61511-1 and give you my perspective of why the change occurred.  

This is the first of a five articles series. Don’t miss the next issue! 

Read First Article

Some organizations invest thousands, sometimes millions, of dollars on automation systems in safety applications with the desire to minimize the risk of their enterprise. However, spending dollars does not mean that the plant will reach the desired degree of safety after implementation. Return on investment in safety controls, alarms, and interlocks (SCAI) can be negatively impacted by human error, such as inadequate design, installation, testing, maintenance, and operation of the automation systems. These human errors are systematic failures that can be reflected throughout a site. Organizational discipline and administrative controls are needed to identify and correct these failures.

This paper was presented at the the 12th Global Conference on Process Safety. It discusses important aspects of process safety management and how they are connected to the effectiveness of the SCAI. Functional safety auditing specifically looks at the management systems and procedures required to keep SCAI working effectively. The case studies presented will illustrate how safety system effectiveness could have been improved if a detailed audit of the SCAI documentation and performance records had been conducted and the findings addressed in a timely fashion.

Read full paper

When purchasing a car, experienced buyers often perform a few examinations before signing the final papers. Among them are inspecting the car to ascertain it is the right color and has all the optional features being paid for, checking that it has received a satisfactory safety inspection report, and performing a test drive to personally confirm the car is ready to be driven off the lot. These inquiries seem sensible precautions. As buyers we recognize the possibility that there could have been an error made in the bill of sale, a possible defect in the car construction, or damage done in transporting the vehicle to the car lot where it is being purchased.In addition, the personal financial consequences for buying a “lemon” (the colloquial name for a recently sold defective car) can be substantial.

The possible consequences for starting up a new or modified inherently hazardous process with defective safeguards are significantly greater and potentially fatal. For this reason, process owners need to ensure that new or modified safety systems meet recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices (RAGAGEP) and are fully functional before relying on them to safeguard the lives of those in their facility. This is why the industry standards for instrumented safeguards include the following practices:

• Verification, and
• Validation.

Read More.

Please visit this edition’s Unsafe Automation Incident case study, to see an example of how failure in safety interlock bypass management led to a multiple fatality outcome.

Our next industry incident case study showcases the use of a safety system final element bypass feature without adequate access restriction leads to a release with fatal consequences.

Impact:

Explosion; 2 fatalities; 8 injuries; damage up to 7 miles away; 40,000 West Virginia University students sheltered in place; roads closed for hours; destruction of facility equipment and lost production; $5.8 million USD in fines and lawsuit settlements to date.

Read more about the Institute incident here.

During the 71th Annual Instrumentation Symposium for the Process Industries in January 27-29, 2016, Shane Pirtle, from SIS-TECH in cooperation with Joseph Dufresne, James Beall, Craig Jeane, and Bart Propst, presented a workshop  under the title “Control Valve Troubleshooting using Potential Failure Analysis”.

Control valves are ubiquitous in the process industry. Troubleshooting, diagnosing and repairing valves should be a core competency for any chemical manufacturing facility, but many sites are just running control valves to failure due to staff reductions, limited valve experience and poor record keeping. Utilizing valve manufacturer provided information and troubleshooting guides, coupled with potential failure analysis has great benefits for troubleshooting control valves. A troubleshooting graphic tool captures existing experience and knowledge, making it more available for troubleshooting and personnel training. The presentation demonstrated how the potential failure analysis can be utilized. Plant examples were used to walk through control valve troubleshooting exercises.

Click here to see presentation

A large energy company wanted a high integrity SIS to prevent a very serious process safety event involving the release of natural gas. The chosen system also needed to be highly reliable, because significant production impact would occur if the system failed spuriously. A Diamond-SIS® in a 2oo3 configuration easily met the high integrity and high reliability requirements. To prevent the event, the Diamond-SIS® initiates closure of redundant block valves when high pressure is detected.

In addition, the energy company wanted the SIS to be energized-to-trip, which introduces loss of circuit integrity as a cause of failure. A supervisory circuit using a low powered relay (24V ac) was needed to monitor the power supply and to trigger an alarm when circuit continuity is lost. The supervisory circuit was easy to add to the Diamond-SIS® panel. The high integrity, high reliability and high diagnostic system was designed, built, tested, and shipped in 8 weeks.

Please contact Pete Fuller for more information on SIS-TECH Applications.

SIS-TECH Workshops:

SIS-TECH Beaumont Workshop will be held on Tuesday June 7, 2016 at

MCM Elegante.
2355 Interstate 10 Access Rd, Beaumont TX.

If you would like to attend, please contact Mandy Dixon at mdixon@sis-tech.com

Events:

29th Annual Environmental Health & Safety Seminar
June 6-9, 2016
Galveston – Moody Gardens Convention Center

Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center International Symposium
October 25-27, 2016
College Station – Hilton Conference Center

ISA Process Control and Safety Symposium
November 7-10, 2016
Houston – Houston Marriot Westchase

Training:

Jun. 14, 2016, Layers of Protection Analysis – 2 day course in fundamentals of Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). Class outline

Jul. 12, 2016, TÜV Rheinland FSEng Training/Certificate – 4 day course in hazards identification techniques, requirements for designing and managing SIS. Certification is available. Class outline

Sep. 13, 2016, Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) – 2 day course in fundamentals of the Process Hazard Analysis. Class outline

Sep. 20, 2016, SIS Implementation – 3 day course in an overview of the SIS management system – the Safety Lifecycle. Certification of completion from MKOPSC. An optional test may be taken to become PRISM-Certified. Class outline

Nov 15, 2016, SIL Verification Using Quantitative Techniques – 2 day course in verification of safety instrumented functions. Class outline

Nov 17, 2016, SIL Solver – 1 day course using SIL Solver Software; a SIL verification tool. Class outline

 

Additional Dates and training catalog.