Three Day SIS Implementation
Audience: Control systems engineers, instrument engineers, electrical engineers, and process safety specialists
Day 1 8:30 am to 4:30 pm Day 2 8:30 am to 4:30 pm Day 3 8:30 am to 4:00 pm
Upcoming: March 25, 2014
This 3-day course explains how risk analysis techniques, such as layer of protection analysis (LOPA), are used to identify the need for administrative and engineered safeguards. When LOPA determines that a safety instrumented system (SIS) is required, the required risk reduction becomes the performance target for the SIS. IEC 61511 establishes requirements for designing and managing SISs to achieve specified safety integrity levels (SIL), which are related to order of magnitude ranges of risk reduction. These requirements are presented using a lifecycle framework and supplemented with several industry guidance documents.
The course is designed to provide the student with an understanding of the management system, how to perform LOPA to identify the need for an SIS and to assign the SIL, how to design the SIS to meet the specified SIL, how to verify that the SIL can be achieved, and how to develop an operating plan to maintain the SIL throughout the SIS life. Attendees receive a certificate of completion from MKOPSC. An optional test is given at the conclusion of the course to become Protective System Management (PRISM) – Certified.
The course is taught here in our Houston office as part of Texas A&M University Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center (MKOPSC) Continuing Education Short Courses program. This link will take you to their registration site. Use the Schedule of Classes & Registration option under Standard Courses.
About the Course Developer
Dr. Angela Summers is president of SIS-TECH, a specialty engineering and consulting company. She has more than 20 years of experience in safety instrumented systems (SIS), process engineering, and environmental engineering. She is an active participant in industrial practice’s committees, such as CCPS, API, ISA and IEC, and has published over 50 papers on topics related to process safety and instrumented system design. She has written chapters on SIS for engineering handbooks and was lead editor for the Center for Chemical Process Safety book, Guidelines for Safe and Reliable Instrumented Protective Systems.
DAY 1 – GETTING STARTED
- Module 1 SIS Standards Overview
- Module 2 Planning
- Module 3 Process Risk and Protection Layers
- Module 4 Establishing Risk Evaluation Criteria
DAY 2 – RISK ANALYSIS TO DESIGN
- Module 5 Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
- Module 6 Safety Requirements Specification Part 1
- Module 7 Safety Requirements Specification Part 2
- Module 8 Selection of Devices
DAY 3 –VERIFICATION AND OPERATING BASIS
- Module 9 Data Estimation
- Module 10 Design Decisions
- Module 11 Verification Example
- Module 12 Operating Basis
DAY 1 – GETTING STARTED
Module 1 SIS Standards Overview
The course begins with a brief introduction to the various good engineering practices that apply to safety instrumented systems (SISs) implemented in process industry facilities. Special focus is given to international standards, such as IEC 61511 and 61508, and recognized guidance documents, such as the CCPS Guidelines books and several ISA technical reports.
Module 2 Planning
An overview of IEC 61511 is presented followed by detailed requirements for the safety management system contained in Clauses 5 through 7. Key elements are competence, independent review, verification, functional assessment, management of change, and auditing.
Module 3 Process Risk and Protection Layers
Process risk derives from process miss-operation and is an inherent part of process design. This inherent risk must be reduced below internationally accepted risk criteria using independent protection layers (IPLs) that are designed and managed to meet seven (7) core attributes.
Module 4 Establishing Risk Evaluation Criteria
The risk assessment phase is addressed in IEC 61511 Clauses 8 and 9. The initiating events for process hazards are identified and the frequency and consequence severity of each potential event is estimated. Depending on the type of risk analysis, various conditional modifiers may also be considered when assessing the risk. Once the risk is understood, a risk reduction strategy can be developed.
DAY 2 – RISK ANALYSIS TO DESIGN
Module 5 Layer of Protection Analysis
Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) is covered in the CCPS book, Layer of Protection Analysis: Simplified Process Risk Assessment. LOPA identifies the initiating events and their frequency, the consequences and their severity, the required risk reduction, and the protective functions implemented in each protection layer to achieve the required risk reduction.
Module 6 Safety Requirements Specification (SRS) Part 1
The SRS in IEC 61511 Clause 10 is a collection of information that specifies the SIS design basis required to ensure process safety during all operating modes. The SRS defines the functionality, integrity, reliability, operability, and maintainability requirements based on operational goals, intended operating modes and process safety time limitations.
Module 7 Safety Requirements Specification Part 2
IEC 61511 Clause 11 provides many specific design requirements including the need for fault tolerance and separation of the SIS from the BPCS.
Module 8 Selection of Devices
SIS device selection is addressed in IEC 61511 Clause 11.5. ISA TR84.00.04 guidance is presented related to field devices and logic solvers. Emphasis is placed on demonstrating that the device is user-approved for safety based on a review of manufacturer information and actual field experience.
DAY 3 – VERIFICATION AND OPERATING BASIS
Module 9 Data Estimation
IEC 61511 Clause 11.9 requires verification of the SIS performance through calculation of the probability of failure on demand (PFD) and the spurious trip rate of the SIS as specified and maintained. Various types of data estimates are discussed with an emphasis on collecting internal and industrial data.
Module 10 Design Decisions
The voting architecture, diagnostic coverage, proof test interval, and common cause failure potential affect the achievable PFD and the spurious trip rate. The impact of each design decision is discussed and typical examples are presented.
Module 11 Example Verification
An example SIF will be assessed to illustrate how choices in field device architecture, test interval, and logic solver technology affect the achievable PFD and spurious trip rate.
Module 12 Operating Basis
There are many day-to-day operation and maintenance activities that must take place for the SIS to sustain its expected performance throughout its installed life. Operation and maintenance procedures must be developed and verified prior to the introduction of hazards into the process unit. These procedures support the detection and response to faults and process alarms, the initiation of manual shutdown, reset after shutdown, and proof tests.